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The current pandemic is said to be the worst health crisis the world has experienced
for a century. Beyond causing thousands to die and millions to lose their jobs, it has
also caused more than ever before governments to declare a state of emergency
and, thus, to considerably broaden their own competencies. Previous experience,
however, has shown that governments do not use their additional powers to save
lives but, rather, to make themselves better off. Considering that more than half of
the world’s democracies have declared a state of emergency, the rule of law will be
subject to a number of dangers in the following months.
Until today, almost 100 countries on all continents have declared a state of
emergency. And this is only counting emergencies declared on the national level,
implying that federal countries like Australia and Canada could be added to the list,
as the authority to declare emergencies in these countries often rests with regions.
A state of emergency regularly implies that the government has the right to derogate
from some basic rights – such as the freedom to assemble, to move freely, to
practice one’s religion, the right to privacy and so on. And governments are making
ample use of their additional powers, just think of the various tracking measures
imposed by many governments. A state of emergency also implies that the other
two branches of government are weakened. Many constitutions grant the executive
the power to rule by decrees, i.e. to bypass the legislature, during an emergency.
The judiciary has been weakened in a very hands-on manner during the current
wave of emergency declarations: many courts have simply been shut down, implying
that it has become difficult or even outright impossible to challenge the legality of
government actions. In addition, the Israeli government has challenged the power of
the Supreme Court by refusing to follow its directions.
In previous research, we analyzed the effects of states of emergency that were
declared following a natural disaster. The current pandemic is a biological disaster
but natural disasters also comprise tsunamis, floods, volcano outbreaks and so forth.
Our findings were unexpected – and alarming: controlling for the size of a disaster,
we find that calling a state of emergency is connected with more – not less – people
dying. It thus seems that governments do not use their additional powers to save
lives but, rather, to make themselves better off.
Doesn’t sound plausible? But this time is different? Let’s have a look at the facts first.
Until today, 98 governments on all continents have declared a state of emergency
due to COVID-19. We find that democracies are more likely to declare a state of
emergency than autocracies. 33% of all autocracies have declared versus 54% of
the world’s democracies, although many autocracies have declared very rapidly. Half
of all autocracies declared a state of emergency within a week of the first confirmed
case of COVID 19 while democracies typically take twice that time. Both of these
findings are immediately plausible: autocrats already enjoy vast powers, declaring a
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state of emergency will give them fewer extra powers than democratic governments.
This is why democracies declare more often. Autocracies are, however, faster in
declaring because it is less cumbersome to declare. In academic lingo: fewer veto
players need to consent.
Constitutionalized emergency provisions promise different benefits to governments
in different countries: some may dissolve parliament, some may postpone elections,
some may suspend individual rights, some may censor the media and so forth. In
earlier research, we have created an indicator reflecting these benefits: the right
to, for example, dissolve parliament, censor the press and repress civil liberties. A
conjecture is that those governments who benefit more from emergency provisions
are more likely to invoke them. So can the indicator be used to predict government
behavior during the current crisis? Are governments that enjoy more benefits from a
state of emergency more likely to declare one? The answer is a resounding yes.
Here are some details, as illustrated in the figure: First, governments that enjoy
many benefits from a state of emergency are more likely to declare one than
governments that would enjoy only few benefits. This result holds for both
democracies and autocracies. Second, governments that enjoy many benefits are
faster in declaring a state of emergency. And third, governments that enjoy many
benefits declare although on the day of the declaration they have far fewer confirmed
cases. In other words, one cannot simply claim that these governments merely
declare because they are hit harder. If anything, the data tell the opposite story.
(In the Figure, we have divided countries in two halves: those whose constitutions
contain limited additional benefits to the executive [the grey columns on the left] and
those whose constitutions allocate substantial benefits to government [the black
columns on the right]).
And here are only a number of examples of how politicians have taken advantage
of the current states of emergency. Hungary’s parliament has passed a law giving
Viktor Orbán the possibility to dissolve parliament and rule by decree for an infinite
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amount of time. This is close to getting rid of democracy entirely. Pointing at the
pandemic and the state of emergency, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu
has sent the country’s courts on vacation, postponing a corruption trial against
himself. Sierra Leone did not only declare a state of emergency at a time when not a
single person was affected but declared it for no less than an entire year.
A further worry is that the oversight of government authorities often breaks down,
and that governments allow authorities a much wider berth during emergencies.
During the first two weeks after declaring an emergency, the South African police
had for example killed at least eight people when ostensibly enforcing emergency
law. In Albania, the prime minister threatened to let the police use similarly violent
tactics if citizens do not respect a curfew.
Many more examples from both autocracies and democracies could be offered.
But instead, let us point out a number of general dangers that the rule of law will be
subject to in the following months. First, governments will attempt to lower the bars
for declaring a state of emergency (as Japan, e.g., has already done). This means
that we are likely to experience more states of emergency in the future – and more
threats to the rule of law and democracy. Second, there used to be a consensus
that legislation passed under a state of emergency should only remain valid as long
as the state of emergency lasts. But politicians are likely to pass many laws that
will remain in place long after the end of the current crisis. Use of telecom data to
track the whereabouts of mobile phone users is one example referring to privacy,
the passing of laws criminalizing the spread of false information further endangers
media freedom and the functioning of pluralistic democracy tout court. Third, some
governments are likely to try to bypass parliament entirely by ruling by decree. The
example of Viktor Orbán has already been mentioned.
If states of emergency are so often misused, why don’t we experience more
opposition against calling them in the first place? In times of crises, the feeling that
“something needs to be done” is a very human sentiment, but also a real problem
called “action bias”. For many citizens, it therefore seems comforting to observe that
their governments are “doing something”. Yet, the heat of the moment is usually a
bad advisor. Therefore, states of emergency should only be allowed for a limited
time clearly spelled out in legislation. Furthermore, any legislation passed under
a state of emergency should automatically cease to be valid with the end of the
emergency. To keep it, it should be subject to broad public discussion and pass the
conventional parliamentary readings again. Both these insights were realized in the
Roman Republic more than two millennia ago but appear to have been forgotten.
Finally, the competences of some international organizations might need to be
readjusted. Given all the evidence regarding the dangers of a state of emergency,
it is difficult to comprehend how the World Health Organization could encourage
countries to declare a state of emergency. If not, the separation of powers that has
characterized the developed world since 1945 may be yet another victim of the
crisis.
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